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Social Security Provision and 
HIV/AIDS in South Africa: Assessing 
“Disability” in the Context of ARV 
Treatment 
Abstract 
Despite its less-than-stellar implementation, the South African government’s 
2003 commitment to providing free antiretroviral therapy to those with AIDS 
has both provided hope to the many infected while at the same time 
highlighting the gross inadequacies of the current welfare system’s design. 
Examining circumstances in the Western Cape is a useful way of exploring the 
relationship between poverty and HIV/AIDS, as well as the role of government 
welfare programmes in influencing the success or failure of prevention and 
treatment interventions. This paper attempts to outline the shortfalls of the 
current social safety net in South Africa and the particular effects of those 
inadequacies on people suffering with HIV and AIDS. It focuses specifically on 
the disability grant in the Western Cape province, arguing that, in the absence 
of comprehensive unemployment benefits or a universal basic income grant, a 
broader redefinition of disability is needed that takes into account social 
factors in addition to a medical diagnosis. Finally, future legislation is 
evaluated, and potential solutions are suggested and critiqued.  
Introduction 
For a long time, AIDS in South Africa was considered an inevitable death 
sentence for the poor who contracted it. Despite the existence of antiretroviral 
drugs proven to prolong life and suppress the AIDS virus indefinitely, the 
majority of infected South Africans were unable to afford them, and the 
number of new infections and AIDS deaths skyrocketed. New statistics from 
the ASSA2002 demographic model suggest that currently, in 2004, 18.7% of 
adults and 10.8% of all South Africans, almost 4.5 million people, are HIV 
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positive. Few of those infected have had access to treatment. Just recently, 
however, in August 2003, the efforts of countless individuals and NGOs began 
to pay off as the government announced plans for a national rollout of 
antiretrovirals, intended to eventually provide drugs to all those in need, 
regardless of ability to pay. The process has been a slow one plagued by 
problems and setbacks, but in some parts of the country, most notably the urban 
areas of the Western Cape, significant progress has been made. Ironically, 
however, success in the provision of ARVs has highlighted the inadequacy of 
South Africa’s social security system, which currently provides no 
unemployment benefits for almost one third of the population in need of a job; 1 
only those judged too sick to work are supposed to be given a small subsidy, in 
the form of a disability grant, that often serves as the only source of income for 
entire families. This is the terrible irony of an epidemic that slowly takes lives 
while making many unemployed South Africans eligible for just enough money 
to put food on the table. Now, however, in the early stages of the ARV rollout, 
many with AIDS are being forced to make a decision no one should have to 
make, between life-saving medicines and the ability to feed their families. 
Given these circumstances, South Africa is a useful case study for exploring the 
relationship between poverty and HIV/AIDS, as well as the role of government 
programmes in influencing the success or failure of HIV/AIDS prevention and 
treatment interventions. This paper attempts to outline the inadequacies of the 
current social safety net in South Africa and the particular effects of those 
inadequacies on people suffering with HIV and AIDS. It focuses specifically on 
the disability grant in the Western Cape province, arguing, in the absence of 
comprehensive unemployment benefits or a basic income grant, for a broader 
redefinition of disability that takes into account social factors in addition to a 
medical diagnosis. Finally, future legislation is evaluated, and potential 
solutions are suggested and critiqued.  
The Right to Social Assistance 
South Africa’s 1996 constitution is respected the world-over for its 
commitment to equality and its impressive and comprehensive Bill of Rights. 
Among those rights is the right to social assistance, as spelled out in section 27 
(1) (c):  
                                                 
1 According to a broad definition of unemployment (South African Labour Force Survey, 
September 2003). 
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‘everyone has the right to have access to – (c) social security, 
including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependants, appropriate social assistance’.  
To implement this right, Parliament passed Act 59, the Social Assistance Bill, 
in 1992 and then amended it in 2001. The bill provides for a number of social 
grants, each aimed at a particular population. Child support grants, foster care 
grants, and care dependency grants target children; old-age grants and war 
veteran’s grants assist the elderly; disability grants are intended for those 
unable to work; social relief of distress grants assist those in emergencies, and 
grants-in-aid provide additional help for those already receiving another grant 
who cannot take care of themselves. Despite critiques suggesting that means-
testing is an inefficient and inadequate way of targeting those most in-need, 
government continues to insist on assessing income before providing any type 
of grant2. Nationally, approximately eight million people receive social grants, 
584,542 of them, or about 7% of the total, in the Western Cape alone 
(Department of Social Development 2004). At the moment, although the 
national Department of Social Development guides the implementation of 
social assistance, the distribution of funds is left to the individual provinces. In 
2003/4 the Western Cape will spend R3.8 billion (approximately $550 million), 
or 23% of its R16.4 billion budget, on social assistance, an increase of 
approximately 1% from it 2003/2004 budget of R14.5 billion (Western Cape 
Budget Report, 2003/2004).   
This constitutional mandate for the provision of social security poses a number 
of challenges for a middle-income country such as South Africa, especially in 
light of substantial poverty and inequality. A per capita GDP of $10,700 hides 
the fact that fifty percent of South Africans live below the poverty line, many 
of them in under-resourced rural areas or urban townships (CIA 2004). Despite 
a national unemployment rate of 26% by a strict definition, the social assistance 
provided for in Act 59 of 1992 is premised on full-employment, meaning that 
in 2001, none of the 4.2 million unemployed South Africans were eligible for 
help because of their inability to find work (Taylor Report 2002)3. And while 
seven million formally-employed workers are required to contribute to the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), allowing them to collect benefits if 
retrenched, more than 2.7 million South Africans working in the informal 
sector do not contribute and thus are ineligible for assistance (Seekings 2002). 
It is clear that South Africa’s social safety net has a large hole. Whereas the 
                                                 
2 See “Research Review on Social Security Reform and the Basic Income Grant for South 
Africa,” Economic Policy Research Institute, 2002. 
3 A broader definition of that includes those in need of work but no longer actively seeking it 
puts the unemployment rate at 41.8% (see Labour Force Survey, September 2003). 
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right to social assistance is a real one for the young, the old, and the physically 
disabled, millions of poor, working-age adults without jobs are lacking even the 
most basic necessities for themselves and their families. Exacerbated by 
HIV/AIDS in recent years, this problem is one that cannot be ignored any 
longer.   
An Overview of Disability Grants 
The lack of support for the poor unemployed in South Africa has led many 
working-age adults to look to the disability grant as their only potential source 
of income. The Social Assistance Bill of 1992, section (1) defines a “disabled 
person” as: 
‘any person who has attained the prescribed age and is, owing to his 
or her physical or mental disability, unfit to obtain by virtue of any 
service, employment or profession the means needed to enable him 
or her to provide for his or her maintenance’. 
While there may be room for interpretation, the guidelines suggest that 
disability assistance should be provided to those people who, due to physical or 
mental difficulties, are unable to obtain employment. The implicit assumption, 
then, and one that has been mentioned, is that in the absence of disability, 
employment is guaranteed. Given South Africa’s 26% unemployment rate, 
however, this assumption is grossly unrealistic. 
To qualify for a disability grant, an applicant must meet a number of criteria: 
men must be older than 18 and younger than 65, women must be younger than 
60; an applicant may not be receiving another grant from the government, 
he/she must not be in the care of a state institution, and he/she must not be 
capable of working due to a disability. The grant is means-tested, so for a single 
applicant, he/she must have an income of less than R1,502 and assets worth 
less than R266,400. For married applicants, combined income must be less than 
R2,782 with assets worth less than R532,800.4 Grant payouts are determined 
according to assets and income, with the maximum disability grant award in 
2004 at R740/month and the minimum award at R105/month.  
                                                 
4 Means-testing criteria along with the amount of the grant payout may change every year. 
These figures were accurate in 2004. 
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The relatively generous nature of the means-test, however, results in the 
maximum payout for the majority of those eligible for the grant. 
Overview of Disability Assessment Procedures  
Given the national regulations governing disability grants, individual provinces 
have been left to develop assessment tools for measuring an applicant’s ability 
to work in the open labour market. As a result, disparities exist from province 
to province as to who, specifically, is eligible for the grant. In the Western 
Cape prior to 2001, physicians at state-owned clinics and hospitals were 
expected to medically evaluate patients and provide a recommendation to the 
pension medical officers (PMO) at the provincial level. Depending on the 
situation, doctors could suggest a temporary six month grant, a one year grant, 
or a “permanent grant” that could be reviewed at five-year intervals. Along 
with administrators at the Department of Social Services, the PMOs then 
reviewed the applications and made decisions on a monthly basis. In 2001, 
however, the Social Assistance Bill of 1992 was amended to phase out the 
PMOs, who, many complained, were making decisions regarding patient 
welfare without ever examining the patients themselves. In place of the PMOs, 
the new legislation provided for two possibilities: provinces could either rely 
simply on the recommendations of physicians at state clinics and hospitals, 
and/or they could convene assessment panels to evaluate applicants. Many rural 
areas suffering from a shortage of doctors chose to experiment with assessment 
panels, comprised usually of a nurse, an employee from the department of 
social services, a social worker, and a community member. Some provinces 
even made an effort to include a representative from local disability NGOs. In 
addition, all provinces were required to establish a board of appeals to review 
and rule on previous decisions when appealed in writing. 
Responding to a survey conducted by the Black Sash in 2003, an organisation 
which focuses on social assistance in South Africa, eight of the nine provinces 
commented on their experiences with assessment panels and disability grants. 
Limpopo, the Free State, Mpumalanga, and the North-West province each set 
up between two and 35 assessment panels. The Northern and East Cape 
provinces initiated pilot projects for the assessment panels but cancelled them 
due to logistical difficulties. The Western Cape and Gauteng provinces decided 
to make disbursement of disability grants contingent solely on the opinion of a 
state physician (Kallmann 2003). According to Andre Brink, deputy director of 
the Department of Social Services of the Western Cape province, the Western 
Cape chose not to make use of assessment panels for two reasons: first, the 
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national Department of Social Development had interpreted the Social 
Assistance Bill of 1992 (amended 2001) to require a medical disability, and 
second, the national department had provided no operating guidelines for the 
assessment panels. In the absence of a physician and guidelines from the 
national department, assessment panels were making decisions based on largely 
social factors, including, for example, the inability to find employment in a 
given area5. 
Examining Trends in Disability Grant Uptake 
Nationally, the uptake in disability grants has increased from 714,019 in 2002 
to 953,965 in 2003, a 33.6% increase. According to the South Africa 
Commission for Human Rights, however, reporting on responses from the 
National Department of Social Development, only 943,676 people were 
eligible for the grant in 2002/2003 (SAHRC 2002/03). This trend of grant 
uptake exceeding eligibility figures is indicative of problems with reporting 
methods, fraud, or with ambiguities in the eligibility requirements for disability 
grants6. An examination of the grants awarded between 2000/1 and projected 
estimates for 2006/7 shows a general increase in uptake for disability grants. 
The Department of Social Services in the Western Cape attributes the 
substantial jump of 23.37% in 2002/3 to the phasing out of the PMOs, 
effectively easing the process of receiving a disability grant. Artificially high 
growth in 2003/4 is the result of the reinstatement of lapsed temporary 
disability grants due to a court order in the Eastern Cape Mashishi case – 
because recipients were not properly notified of cancellations, the High Court 
of South Africa restored 54,000 six-month grants. The net decline in 2004/5 
reflects the gradual cancellation of these Mashishi grants. The 2005/6 and 
2006/7 estimates reflect a natural annual increase in demand and eligibility for 
disability grants, probably due to the impact of HIV/AIDS in the Western Cape.   
                                                 
5 Interview with Andre Brink, Deputy Director, Department of Social Services, July 26, 
2004. 
6 The national Department of Social Development and the provincial equivalent in the 
Western Cape estimate eligibility for the disability grant according to a model developed by 
Ingrid Woolard of the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa. The model 
attempts to reconcile grants awarded annually with household survey results. 
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Table 1. Disability Grants Awarded in the Western Cape7 
Fiscal Year April August December Total Growth 
2000/1 89,960 92,493 92,844 1,101,385 1.66% 
2001/2 90,721 93,395 98,269 1,141,138 3.61% 
2002/3 105,562 117,656 126,851 1,407,875 23.37% 
2003/4 114,408 128,454 118,541 1,473,314 4.65% 
2004/5 123,196 120,580* 121,806* 1,459,347* -0.95%* 
2005/6 123,348* 125,833* 128,369* 1,521,567* 4.26%* 
2006/7 130,956* 133,595* 136,287* 1,615,413* 6.17%* 
 Note: *Projected estimates. 
HIV/AIDS and Disability Grants 
Given that HIV/AIDS in South Africa is such a debilitating problem, it is 
interesting that social assistance legislation makes no mention of it, even in the 
context of disability grants. As a result, confusion abounds as to when an HIV 
or AIDS diagnosis qualifies a poor South African for social assistance. Those 
suffering from the advanced stages of the disease (stage 4 as defined by the 
World Health Organisation’s guidelines) are symptomatic with serious 
opportunistic infections and often bed-ridden for most of the day; these people 
are unable to work by any definition, and the Western Cape Department of 
Social Services has historically provided them with disability grants. Clinical 
stages 1, 2, and 3, however, are more ambiguous and may or may not be 
marked by symptoms and weight loss. In addition, people living with HIV and 
AIDS may have abnormally low CD4 counts8 without exhibiting symptoms. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention consider an HIV-infected 
person with a CD4 count of less than 200 cells per cubic millimeter of blood to 
have AIDS, regardless of whether they feel sick or healthy. It is possible, then, 
that someone in stage 1 or 2 according to clinical WHO guidelines could have a 
dangerously low CD4 count. And as we will see later, the recent introduction of 
antiretroviral drugs in South Africa has made the reverse true as well: someone 
in stage 4 and on treatment might feel perfectly healthy with a normal CD4 
count. Neither the national Department of Social Development, nor the 
provincial Department of Social Services in the Western Cape has acted on 
                                                 
7 Courtesy of the Department of Social Services, Western Cape. 
8 A CD4 count measures the strength of the body’s immune system and helps track the 
progression of HIV.  
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these important distinctions. Instead, both departments have added to the 
confusion surrounding HIV/AIDS and the awarding of disability grants.  
In March of 2002, a spokesperson for the provincial minister of the Department 
of Social Services and Poverty Alleviation, Marius Fransman, reported in the 
Cape Times newspaper that “The minute you are diagnosed with [HIV/AIDS], 
you can apply for the [disability grant]. If you have proof from a doctor, you 
can apply. It does not matter what stage of the illness you are in” (Cape Times, 
March 21, 2002). Advocacy groups like the Treatment Action Campaign knew 
that those with full-blown AIDS were eligible for the grant, but they welcomed 
this seeming change in provincial policy as reflective of a new commitment to 
fighting the epidemic in its earliest stages. A few weeks later, however, MEC 
Fransman rescinded the earlier statement, but not before many South Africans 
had adopted the misconception that the disability grant was a de facto HIV 
grant as well. Two years later, that misconception perseveres, especially among 
the unemployed desperately in need of even a small monthly income. The 
reality however, is that the Western Cape has now moved towards a strictly 
medical diagnosis: only those in stage 4 of the illness, or the latter parts of stage 
3, are eligible for the disability grant (Department of Social Services and 
Poverty Alleviation 2002). In clinics with the capacity to monitor CD4 counts, 
a count of less than 200, thus signaling an AIDS diagnosis, is also sufficient for 
the awarding of a disability grant; however, rural areas in particular often lack 
the necessary equipment for such laboratory testing9. 
In the context of such high unemployment and general confusion and 
ambiguity surrounding HIV/AIDS and disability grants, many poor South 
Africans, both HIV positive and negative, have tried to use the disability grant 
as a source of income. Many with HIV have gone to primary health clinics 
hoping for a disability grant recommendation from their doctor, only to be 
turned away. Others, many healthy, have resorted to fraud in order to qualify. 
Doctors and administrators from the Department of Social Services are aware 
of numerous “syndicates”10 that forge applications, with the help, it is 
suspected, of insiders within the Department itself. Another, less explicit type 
of “fraud” is practiced by many of the physicians responsible for filling out 
disability forms at health clinics and making recommendations to the province. 
A number of doctors admit to recommending grants for patients with HIV who 
do not qualify according to the ambiguous Western Cape guidelines. They 
explain that patients with HIV need proper nutrition in order to remain healthy 
for longer; in the absence of employment and a disability grant, the majority of 
                                                 
9 According to Karen Kallmann of Black Sash, the Western Cape is the only province to 
have identified specific criteria for the awarding of disability grants for people with AIDS. 
10 Interview with a senior clerk at the district welfare office in Khayelitsha. 
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patients will not have access to the right foods in sufficient quantities. Other 
doctors, including those accountable to larger organisations, like Medecins 
Sans Frontiers, as well as those physicians employed directly by the 
Department of Social Services for the purpose of completing grant 
examinations, are more hesitant to bend the rules when it comes to disability 
grants. On one occasion in the Langa township, the author observed the 
attending physician instruct all her newly diagnosed HIV patients to eat fish, 
chicken, citrus and green vegetables. One patient, an elderly man in his fifties 
without a job, looked at her and asked how he was supposed to afford that kind 
of food without the help of a disability grant. The doctor had no reply as she 
ushered him out the door.   
Recently, the national Department of Social Development has begun tightening 
restrictions on disability grants throughout the provinces, claiming that too 
many people are using the grants as a form of poverty alleviation. According to 
the Department, HIV is not considered a disability but rather a “chronic 
disease,” not severe enough to prevent someone from working in the open labor 
market. In a January 29, 2004 statement, the Minister of Social Development, 
Dr. Zola St Skweyiya, emphasised the state’s position on disability grants and 
HIV/AIDS:   
‘This fraud is partly due to the inability to distinguish clearly 
between people who are disabled and people with chronic 
diseases…The disability grant is not intended to provide relief from 
chronic diseases. The Government is committed to and has been 
implementing a comprehensive strategy to address the issue of HIV / 
AIDS. The Government does not, however, provide a social grant 
specifically or exclusively for people who are HIV Positive’. 
Clearly something is awry in South Africa when those suffering as a result of 
poverty, unemployment, and HIV are denied care by the government 
constitutionally obligated to provide it.   
The Plot Thickens: The Effect of Antiretroviral 
Provision on Disability Grants 
As if things were not complicated enough, the long-awaited, albeit gradual 
introduction of Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART) in some parts 
of South Africa is highlighting the inadequacies of current social assistance. Of 
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the 500,000 people in the country estimated to need treatment, less than 10% of 
them, approximately 45,000, are receiving it, and mostly through the private 
sector. Only 6,000 people are benefiting from ARVs provided by the 
government, despite the August 2003 commitment to make available free 
government treatment to 50,000 within the first year. The Western Cape 
provincial government alone distributes ARVs to approximately 3,057 people, 
and due to its unusual concentration of health NGOs and academic institutions, 
probably provides treatment to thousands more through private channels.11 
Because of the relatively good access to ARVs in the Western Cape, the 
province serves as a potential microcosm for examining the effects of AIDS 
treatments on disability grants and vice versa. 
In 2001, long before free treatment was available to the general public, 
Medecins Sans Frontiers began providing ARVs to a small group of AIDS 
patients at its Site B clinic in Khayelitsha, and today that number has grown to 
more than 1,000. Consequently, it was one of the first locations to come into 
contact with what is now becoming an increasingly common dilemma in the 
Western Cape concerning the provision of disability grants. Modern day 
antiretrovirals are able to suppress the HI virus quite effectively, allowing the 
body’s immune system to recover and decreasing the ability of the virus to pass 
from one person to another. There is debate within medical circles as to when 
ARVs should be initiated, but doctors agree that once started, they must be 
continued indefinitely in order to keep the virus suppressed and to prevent drug 
resistance. If used correctly, ARVs can allow people with AIDS to regain their 
health, but because the virus remains latent in their bodies, they retain an AIDS 
diagnosis. For example, a patient who begins ARVs in WHO stage 4 remains 
stage 4 throughout his life, even if treatment rids him of his symptoms.  
Whereas for the longest time an AIDS diagnosis (WHO clinical stages 3 and 4) 
was practically synonymous with a physical inability to work, ARVs have 
effectively disassociated the two and raised questions about the definition of 
disability in the context of HIV/AIDS. The Western Cape and the national 
Department of Social Development are only now beginning to realise that 
people living with AIDS, if they have access to ARVs, may be healthy enough 
to work in an open labour market. Technically, then, they should not be eligible 
for the disability grant, which the state claims is reserved for those who, due to 
a physical or mental disability, are unable to obtain employment. However, 
according to Western Cape guidelines, which specify that anyone diagnosed 
with stage 3 or stage 4 AIDS who meets the means test is eligible for the grant, 
                                                 
11 Estimates according to the ASSA2002 model and the Treatment Action Campaign (in a 
July 20, 2004 update). 
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people on ARVs are still entitled to the grant because medically they retain 
their clinical diagnosis despite improvements in health. This is a case, then, of 
the letter of the law in conflict with its spirit. 
How are physicians responding to the apparent contradiction? As with 
disability grants in general, some doctors are utilising the apparent loophole to 
continue to provide grants to poor patients on ARVs, ostensibly to help them 
with food and other expenses. Others, however, are refusing to renew disability 
grants for patients who begin to improve on ARVs, citing that these patients are 
theoretically well enough to work.12 The fact that there are no jobs available is 
an unfortunate side-note. For an increasing number of people with AIDS, then, 
the choice is rapidly becoming one between health and just enough income to 
care for themselves and their families.   
The Department of Social Services of the Western Cape has thus far refused to 
address directly the issue of disability grants for people improving on ARVs, 
choosing instead to shift the onus of decision-making to physicians while 
providing only ambiguous guidelines at best. This reliance on a “medical 
model” for defining disability allows the state to justify inadequate social 
assistance by requiring doctors to assess employability in the absence of social 
considerations. According to the Taylor Committee’s report on social security 
in South Africa, this model constitutes a failure to consider “social and labour 
market barriers, as well as broader social and environmental factors which 
inhibit labour market participation” (Taylor Report 2002: section 10.3.1). In 
effect, the state is demanding from doctors an objective outcome, namely that 
only those people physically or mentally unfit to work be awarded disability 
grants, by way of subjective decision-making. As Mr. Andre Brink, deputy 
director for social security in the Western Cape, emphasised repeatedly in a 
July 2004 interview, the Department of Social Services awards disability grants 
based solely on doctor recommendations. But the truth is that doctors are being 
pressured to do, not necessarily what is best for patients, but rather what is best 
for the state and its budget: namely to cancel disability grants for patients on 
ARVs who could theoretically find employment. The  disingenuous nature of 
these justifications becomes evident when one considers that physicians 
employed by the Department of Social Services specifically to handle disability 
                                                 
12 The author was unable to locate provincial documents mandating the cancellation of 
disability grants for people improving on ARVs. However, overwhelming anecdotal 
evidence from doctors, people living with AIDS, and administrators within the Department 
of Social Services suggests that this is indeed the reality in the Western Cape.  
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grant applications at primary health clinics are instructed to cancel grants for 
people with AIDS receiving HAART.13  
Implications of Canceling Disability Grants for 
People on ARVs 
The implications of the Western Cape’s policy of canceling disability grants for 
people improving on ARVs are somewhat disheartening: just as people are 
beginning to regain their health and to put their lives back together, a 
substantial source of income is being withdrawn. From a medical perspective, 
the policy has the potential to create a vicious cycle of sickness and health. The 
disability grant, in conjunction with ARVs, helps individuals gain access to 
proper nutrition and other necessities conducive to health. As soon as a 
standard of health that permits employment is achieved, however, the disability 
grant is cut, leading once again to inadequate nutrition, stress, etc., all of which 
undermine the effectiveness of AIDS treatments and lead to a subsequent 
decline in health. Sickness qualifies the individual for the disability grant once 
again, and the cycle is repeated. In addition to this artificial cycle of sickness 
and health brought about by disability grant policy, the recent cancellations 
create the possibility for an even more explicit set of perverse incentives. In her 
book The Moral Economy of AIDS in South Africa, Nattrass (2004) draws upon 
an interview from a previous study in which a young woman explains how HIV 
has actually improved her life by giving her access to social assistance:  
‘Yes I like this HIV/AIDS because we have grants to support 
us…Before I was staying with my mother and father and sister, they 
didn’t work. Maybe I was taking three to four days without food. 
People discriminated against me and no one came in the house. The 
only thing that was helping was my grandmother’s pension. We 
were surviving on that money. Concerning the illness, our lives are 
changed completely’ (quoted in Steinberg et al. 2002b:29).   
Ironically, in many parts of South Africa, the combination of poverty and 
unemployment has made HIV/AIDS one of the few remaining avenues for 
short-term survival. Now, a similar perverse incentive seems to be rearing its 
head for many of South Africa’s poor suffering from HIV/AIDS and only now 
receiving access to ARVs. Anecdotal evidence suggests that as grants are cut, 
                                                 
13 Interview with physician employed by the Department of Social Services, Western Cape, 
to handle disability grant applications in a number of primary care clinics, July 21, 2004. 
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some people with AIDS may intentionally “yo-yo” on and off treatment in 
order to maintain access to disability grants. In addition to being harmful for 
the individual, this type of behavior undermines the strict treatment adherence 
(greater than 90%) necessary to prevent the development of drug-resistant viral 
strains. 
Some organisations in South Africa are already beginning to question the 
legality of the government’s disability grant policy, specifically as it affects 
people on ARVs. They argue that providing social assistance temporarily 
during periods of illness creates a “legitimate expectation” that social assistance 
will be continued in the absence of available employment; when disability 
grants are stopped, then, the state creates an “undue hardship” for the poor 
suffering from HIV/AIDS,14 in violation of the constitution’s guarantee that the 
state will take “reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation” of the right to healthcare and 
social security (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, chapter 2, 
(27)(2)).   
Overhauling Disability Grants Administration 
The cancellation of disability grants for people on HAART undoubtedly 
demonstrates that social assistance in South Africa is not serving those people 
who need it most. But in addition to its failure with regard to people with 
HIV/AIDS, disability grants suffer from a host of additional administrative 
problems that undermine their effectiveness, including misinformation, 
excessive requirements, backlogs, sub-par delivery mechanisms, and fraud.  
Misinformation and excessive requirements together have contributed to the 
inaccessibility of social grants for the poor who need them. Ambiguity and 
confusion surrounding disability grant criteria is compounded by conflicting 
information provided by the Department of Social Services through its various 
media channels. The Western Cape’s provincial website and its free social 
assistance telephone information line describe different means-testing criteria 
for the same grant. Furthermore, ignorance among the administrative staff at 
some of the district welfare offices, including those in relatively affluent areas 
of Cape Town, makes it unlikely that accurate information is being conveyed to 
applicants. The manager of the Wynberg district office’s assessment 
department for disability grants was surprisingly misinformed about AIDS in 
                                                 
14 Interview with Ms. Fatima Hassan of the AIDS Law Project, July 26, 2004. 
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general and the provincial policy for people on HAART; according to him, a 
clinical diagnosis of stage 4 AIDS guarantees certain death for the patient soon 
after, making disability grants unnecessary.15 Of course, ARVs have been 
proven quite effective in prolonging life indefinitely for people with a stage 4 
diagnosis. The fact that those responsible for distributing grants to the disabled 
are unaware of this basic fact is troubling and does not speak highly of the state 
of social assistance in South Africa. This same manager admitted that the 
Western Cape has intentionally withheld information from the general 
population in order to constrain budgetary pressures and limit the workload for 
government staff. He noted, for example, that a public campaign to inform 
South Africans of their right to appeal a grant decision would lead to an 
unmanageable influx of applications. Requiring that these appeals be made in 
writing ensures that many of the poorest South Africans, many of whom are 
illiterate, do not get the hearing they deserve. Convenience, then, rather than a 
desire to provide adequate social assistance, seems to be the priority in the 
Western Cape.  
Eligibility and access aside, social grants and disability grants in particular 
suffer from excessive backlogs and delivery difficulties. Because disability 
grants are intended to serve the sick, the Department of Social Services 
guarantees that applications will be processed within 35 working days. 
However, interviews with people both living with AIDS and receiving 
disability grants suggest that the actual processing period is three months or 
more. A deputy director of social security at the Department of Social Services 
admitted that backlogs have significantly delayed the disbursement of grants 
and that many people desperately in need of assistance are suffering in the 
interim. For people in the advanced stages of AIDS without access to HAART, 
these delays can often mean the difference between life and death. Delivery and 
notification problems (such as those ruled upon in the Eastern Cape Mashishi 
case in 2003) have exacerbated the situation.   
Finally, as previously mentioned, desperate unemployment in South Africa has 
led to a high demand for access to disability grants, regardless of a medical 
disability. Syndicates have formed to facilitate the fraudulent access to 
disability grants with the help of insiders within the Department of Social 
Services. The Department has developed a number of preventative measures to 
cut down on fraud and corruption, including a revised disability grants medical 
assessment form, but nothing has been done to eliminate the incentives that 
encourage people to circumvent the system in the first place. As long as 
                                                 
15 Interview with the manager of the assessment section of the Wynberg office for social 
services, July 19, 2004.  
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disability grants remain the only way for working-age adults to have access to 
income in the context of high unemployment, fraud seems inevitable.   
The Case for a “Social Model” of Assistance 
The experience of disability grants in the Western Cape highlights some of the 
limitations of a medical model for defining disability. Given high 
unemployment in the South Africa, a physical or mental disability is not the 
only factor, or even the primary factor, that prevents the poor from finding 
work and earning an income to care for themselves and their families. For those 
people suffering from HIV/AIDS, the medical model ensures that only those on 
the verge of death receive assistance, and with the cancellation of grants for 
those on HAART, the same model ignores the fact that treatment alone is 
ineffective unless combined with proper nutrition and economic empowerment.  
This paper argues that, in the absence of comprehensive unemployment 
benefits or a universal basic income grant, a broader definition of disability is 
required, one which focuses not on the traditional understanding of disabilities, 
but rather on the social and environmental factors that are disabling. Within 
this framework, not only do people with HIV/AIDS deserve social assistance, 
but importantly, all people living in poverty without access to education, to 
employment, and to healthcare deserve state support as mandated by South 
Africa’s Bill of Rights. This broader notion of disability is supported by the 
United Nations Standard Rules on the Equalisation of Opportunities for 
Persons with Disabilities, which “recognizes the necessity of addressing both 
the individual needs (such as rehabilitation and technical aids) and the 
shortcomings of the society (various obstacles for participation)” (UN 1993: 3). 
This same document argues that the cessation of social assistance to people 
with disabilities should depend not only on medical factors, but on economic 
and social factors as well:  
‘Income support should be maintained as long as the disabling 
conditions remain in a manner that does not discourage persons 
with disabilities from seeking employment. It should only be 
reduced or terminated when persons with disabilities achieve 
adequate and secure income’ (UN 1994: rule 8 (6), pg 15). 
In other words, governments should support their disability citizens not only 
while they are ill, but also while they are healthy and struggling to find work. 
The 1997 White Paper on an Integrated National Disability Strategy, issued by 
the South African government itself, makes a similar argument, advocating for 
a broader understanding of disability based on social circumstances: 
‘It must also be stressed that the system should not define 
beneficiaries according to the disability, but should rather determine 
provisioning in response to need’ (Integrated National Disability 
Strategy White Paper, 1997, (10.4.3.2)). 
The challenge, as identified by the UN Standard Rules, is to create a system of 
social assistance for those in disabling circumstances “that does not discourage 
persons with disabilities from seeking employment” (UN Standard Rules on the 
Equalisation of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, Rule 8). Social 
conservatives have long used this excuse to argue against comprehensive social 
security and welfare benefits, but given South Africa’s extreme poverty, 
inequality, and unemployment, the argument that helping people to meet their 
most basic needs encourages laziness rings hollow.  
Moving Towards a Solution 
In order for South Africa to realise the constitutional right to social security, the 
country needs to move towards a system of social assistance not premised on 
the illusion of full employment. Disability grants are necessary for those people 
too sick to work, including those people suffering with AIDS. The problem, 
however, is that in the absence of disability grants, South Africa currently 
provides no social assistance for the poor in need of work. The unfortunate 
consequence has been that just as people begin to regain their health with the 
help of ARVs, their small monthly income is cut, leaving them unable to meet 
even their most basic needs.  
South Africa requires a social security system that does not force people with 
AIDS to choose between income and health. The government must streamline 
disability grants to remove problems of maladministration and clarify criteria 
both for applicants and for doctors charged with assessing their patients for 
disability. By making available the proper equipment and the necessary staff to 
operate it at primary health care clinics across the Western Cape, the provincial 
government could use CD4 counts to accurately measure the health of a person 
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with AIDS on HAART, regardless of their diagnosed clinical stage. In addition, 
however, the Western Cape and the national Department of Social 
Development must provide support for all people, including those on AIDS 
treatments, who are unable to find work. In addition to more effective job 
creation, the government should adopt a proposal put forward by the 
Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social Security System for South 
Africa in 2002 calling for a Basic Income Grant for all South Africans. The 
Basic Income Grant would provide a universal monthly grant of approximately 
R100/person and subsequently tax that money back from the wealthy, ensuring 
that everyone, regardless of health, is able to afford food and other basic 
necessities.16  
At the moment, however, the South African government is not moving in this 
direction. While the responsibility for social security is being removed from the 
provinces and consolidated under the national government in the form of the 
National Social Security Agency, hopefully reducing criteria inconsistencies 
across provinces, a new Social Assistance Bill approved in 2004 offers much of 
the same. It retains a medical model of disability without offering a way to 
address the social and economic factors that are disabling for many poor South 
Africans in need of a job. For people with HIV/AIDS, these changes offer little 
hope for the future. AIDS may unfortunately remain one of only a few ways to 
access social assistance, entrenching the perverse incentives that currently 
exist. And for those people with AIDS lucky enough to have access to life-
prolonging treatments, the impending choice as their disability grants run out 






                                                 
16 For an exhaustive discussion of the Basic Income Grant, see Seekings (2002).  
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The CSSR is an umbrella organisation comprising five units:  
 
The Aids and Society Research Unit (ASRU) supports quantitative 
and qualitative research into the social and economic impact of 
the HIV pandemic in Southern Africa.  Focus areas include:  the 
economics of reducing mother to child transmission of HIV, the 
impact of HIV on firms and households; and psychological 
aspects of HIV infection and prevention.  ASRU operates an 
outreach programme in Khayelitsha (the Memory Box Project) 
which provides training and counselling for HIV positive people 
 
The Data First Resource Unit (‘Data First’) provides training and 
resources for research.  Its main functions are: 1) to provide 
access to digital data resources and specialised published 
material; 2) to facilitate the collection, exchange and use of data 
sets on a collaborative basis; 3) to provide basic and advanced 
training in data analysis; 4) the ongoing development of a web 
site to disseminate data and research output.    
 
The Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU) supports students 
and scholars who conduct systematic research in the following 
three areas:  1) public opinion and political culture in Africa and 
its role in democratisation and consolidation; 2) elections and 
voting in Africa; and 3) the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on 
democratisation in Southern Africa. DARU has developed close 
working relationships with projects such as the Afrobarometer (a 
cross national survey of public opinion in fifteen African countries), 
the Comparative National Elections Project, and the Health 
Economics and AIDS Research Unit at the University of Natal. 
 
The Social Surveys Unit (SSU) promotes critical analysis of the 
methodology, ethics and results of South African social science 
research. One core activity is the Cape Area Panel Study of 
young adults in Cape Town.  This study follows 4800 young people 
as they move from school into the labour market and adulthood.  
The SSU is also planning a survey for 2004 on aspects of social 
capital, crime, and attitudes toward inequality. 
 
The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) was established in 1975 as part of the School of 
Economics and joined the CSSR in 2002.  SALDRU conducted the 
first national household survey in 1993 (the Project for Statistics on 
Living Standards and Development).  More recently, SALDRU ran 
the Langeberg Integrated Family survey (1999) and the 
Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey (2000).  Current projects 
include research on public works programmes, poverty and 
inequality.  
 
 
 
